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C H A P T V IH I.
OF R E C hI V E R S - E ij E P A L L Y'.
A receiver, in the legal acceptation of the term,
may be defined as"an indifferent person betv ren the
parties to a cause, appointed by the court to receive
and preserie the property or fund in litigation pen-
donte lite, when it does not seem reasonable to the
court that either party should lold 1ts" (1)
The appointment of a receiver pendente lite is
one of the oldest, arid han always been regarded as one
of tie most salutary and effective remedial agencies of
which the court of equity has taken cognizance. Tihe
origin of this equitable re'riedy is involved in doubt;
but germs of the present system are founrd to have ex-
isted at a period almost as remote as the rise of equi-
ty as a seperate jurisenrudence. Vinlle the jurisdic-
tion of equity, to thus Interfereby the appointment
of a receiver, has been long recognized; courts of equ-
(1) High on Receivers, Sec. 1 ;
Booth v Clark, 17 How. (U.S.) 322.
ty have uniformly procee',ed with great caution in the
exercise of this moot extraordinary power.
Formerly a receiver would only be appointed up-
on special gro'unds justifying ouch an interference,
In the nature of a bill quasi timet, w!ich procedure
was probably borrowed from the title of some of' the
-ncient conmmon law writs.(1) Within more recent per-
iods, we find the appoinment of a receiver confined
almost exclusively to cases arising out of litigation
in the form of a creditor's bill. But in spite of
these restrictions, the jurisdiction of the court of
b een
equity has gradually and surely extended, until at the
present time it embraces almost every class of subject
matter over which litigation can arise or the claims
of sultors attach.
This extention was brought about in Ligland,
largely, by the judicature act of 183 whIch provided:
that the power to appoint a receiver should be extended
to all caoeo where it should appear to the court to
(1) JI, Story's Equity Jurloprudence, Sec. E25.
be just and convenient; and ouch application might be
made unconditionally, or upon ouch terms and condltlona
as the c-urt might think just. (1) Slmllar changes
have been brought about in thl courntry, partly by
legislatlve enactment and partly by judicial decisions.
Not only has the subject matter, ov( r which a
recelver may be appointed, been greatly extended; but
it has also become customary to cloth receivers with
much greater powers than were formerly conferred upon
them. But while the rules of practice and procedure
have thus been changed from time to time; the funda-
mental principles which govern their appointment, de-
termilne their powers and fix their liabilities, remain
substaritially the same.
It is not my purpose to attempt to trace the his-
tory of thi8 branch of equity jurisprudence; kut rather
to give as near as may be the practice and Drocedure
which are necessarily involved1 in the appointment of
receiver, and some of the principal powers and liabil-
(1) Par. B Sec. 25.
itie which attach to that officer. In diocussing
these polnto,.I 8hall endeavor to follow the rulen of
practice and procedure an recogized and enforced by
courts of equity in t hin country at the precent time,
with secial reference to the old chancery practice of
New Yor'k.which has been very largely followed by most
of the otateo of thls co-untry.
C H A P T E i II.
APPOJINTMEhT O.F A REGEIVER
General Principles governing the Appointment
As a general rule, the court will not grant an
application for the appointment of a receiver, save in
e.ceptional cases, as in the case of an infant or lun-
atic, unles a suit is actually pending. (1) In any
cace the primary object sought to be attained by the
appointment of a receiver Is to save In tact and undi-
minished, as far as possible, the subject matter in
controversy, for the benefit of those who are found to
be equitably entitled. Hence It follows that ", the
power to appoint a receiver is most usually called into
action, either to prevnt fraud, save the subject of
litigation from material injury, or rescue It from
threatened destruction." (2)
In general the party making the application for
(1) Jones v Schall, 45 Mlch. 379.
(2) Baker v Administrators of Backus, 32 Ill. 79.
a receiver must show to the satisfaction of the court,
that he has some clear right or interest In the proper-
ty In controversy, and unle.ss relief is grantel, he
will suffer irreparable injury, through the ne-lect,
misconduct or Insolvency of' the defencdant.
The application for a receiver Is alwuats addresr-
ed to the sound dlocretlon o the court;(1) but as to
the extent of such discretion, there has been nome
difference of opinion; some courts holdin,; that the
power to appoint a receiver Is a matter of arbitrary
discretion on the part of the court, and when once male
cannot be Interferred with on appeal. (2) The better
and more generally accepted rule 18 thus stated by
Miller. J.0"while the litigation is pending and involv-
es questions of title, fraud and the like, the appoint-
ment and discharge of a receiver is purely discretion-
ary and wihin the sole power of the court ; but where
these questions hat.s been pasred upon, and there Is a
definite and fixed right and a clear titlethe appoint-
-----------------------------------------------------
(1) II Story's Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. 881.
(2) WI lson v Denis, 1 Hop. Ch. 485.
ment or discharge 18 not discretionary, and it is not
within the power of the court to with hold it. (1)
The controllng elemento which determine the ad-
visability of appolntlnir a receiver are the nuture and
condition of the subject matter, the relation of the
parties, the peculiar facts and circumstances3 attending
each case and the probability of the plaintiff being
untimately entitled to a decree. Like most equitable
remedies the underlylng principles whici justify the
court of equity in interferingare the pos8iblllty of
irreparable mischief and the inability of the law to
render the relief sought. (2)
Courts exercising Jurisdiction.
The appointment of' a receiver is strictly an
original process and is exercised almost exclusively
by courts having equity power. In states having a
seperate chancery sysjtem, the power to appoint a receiv-
er is generally limited to these tribunals; but in
(!) MLt TwiJ r F.. .r Cout.r 2-L \Th 1. Ai)' F
(7) 1or r1L1QS overaing the appointment of receiver
.ee Blondliei v lonrop, 11 iUd. Ch. 73;f5,
See also valuable note 64 Am_. Dec. 4d2-95.
those HtaUtea where the Gy,; tem of e(luity uiid law iV-ve
booti e 1eulole. , LI I court of or Igir 10 ju1 I cl (It", r(4 1
ro)po~r 1 t such appointment.
In states which have adopted codeo of procedure,
the courts which may appoint a receiver are usually
determined by special statutory provisions. In New
York the supreme court, the superior, city or county
courts may appoint a receiver in cases specified in
section i13 of the code of civil procedure.
As a general rule the court first acquiring
jurisdiction will retain jurisdiction till the end of
litigation;and this rule is equally applicable to state
and federal courts as well as courts of co-ordinate
jurisdiction. (1)
Strictly speaking, a court cannot appoint a re-
ceiver over subject matter not within ltw- jurisdiction,
but departures from this rule are frequently made,
owing to considerations of comity which exists between
diffenent courts. (2)
(1) 7 Chicago Legal News, 38.
(2) Taylor v Insurance Co., 14 Allen 353;
See post page 47 and cases cited.
Over what Subject Matter a Receiver may be appointed.
Creditors bill:- In no class of cases hao the aid of
equity, by the appointment of a receiver, been more
frequently invoked than In creditors suits. The
property of the debtc r equitably belongs to the cred-
!tor; and it is to prevent a disposition of the debtors
property during the litigation, that a receiver is
appointed In this class of cases.
1he right of the creditors to the property or
fund in question having been ascertained, the court will
proceed to distribute the same among them, according
to the extent of their res3pective interests.
The former -New York practice was to appoint a
receiver In creditors suits after return of execution
tnsatisfled, almost as a matter of course. (1) Thla
procedure has been practically superseded by supple-
mentary proceedings under the code, which are more
expeditious and equally available.
DlIssolutlon of a partnership:- Here a receiver will
----------------------------------------------------
(1) Fitzburg v Everingham, 6 Paigeo Ch. 29.
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be appointed upon the applicatilon of' any interented
party. (1) hut a receiver will not ordinarily be ap-
pointed to carry on partnership buslness,1"nor will a
dissolution be ,tllowed unless the company is insol-
vent or fraud is shown or some other good ground
exi s ts. " (2)
Mortgage foreclosure:- A receiver will only be ap-
vointed in this class of cases, when it can be shown
that the mortgage premisres are insufficient security
for the satisfaction of the debt, and that the party
personally liable for the debt is Insolvnt. (3)
Corporations:- The court of equity, In absence of
statutory provisions, enters with extreme reluctance
and only in cases of absolute necessity Into the ex-
ercise of its power, to managce through a receiver, the
complicatei affairs of a corporation. It han been
held in a leading ELglloh case, (4) that a receiver-
(1) Law v Ford, 2 Palges Ch. 210.
(2) Martin v VanSchalk, 4 Palgeo Ch. 479.
(a) Warner v Goveneur, 1 1B3arb. 568;
Haas etal, v Chicago Building Society 89 Ill. 4U8
But see Gorblegen v Hathaway, 11 N.J. Eq. 89'
the leading N1\ew Jersey case upon this point.
(4) Gardner v Loiidon Chathan Andover R.R.Co.
2 Law heport8 (Ch. Div.) 201.
should not be appoIntel except in the course of pro-
ceedings, in which the result of the ecree would be
a virtual dissolution of the corporation. Under the
ropmer equity practice, simple miscon'luct or bad faith
on the part of some or 1l1 of the trustees or officers,
would not constitute sufficient ground for the appoint-
ment of a receiver.
Put all this has been changed by le7illitlve
enactment In nearly every -,tate, and in some vtotes
the opposite extreme seems to have been reached.
Permanent receivers are appointed who are empowerel
to take the property out of the hands of the corporate
managers, and to carry on the business of the corpor-
ation, in connebtion with the court, issue receivers
certificates, which take priority over antecedent liens
and are otherwl;e clothed with extensive and dangerous
p O!; e r 8.
"More than two-thirds of the great railroad cor-
porations of our country have at some time during their
existence, been under the control of a receiver." TM
condition of affairs has been brou;ht about lar <elj,
by the increasing tendency of the courts, to allow a
receiver to take poceseion of the corportite property
ani conduct ito bulnems, In cuses of' financial em-
barrasoment only.
The exercle of thing re'tt liberality has not
always been conducive to the bn:t int ..:T(tf of cot-
!-orate creditore; and rnny protet by e.inent author-
itles have been made agaiinst any further extentloa In
this direction. (1)
Thle extraordinary pov-er should only be called
into activity, when It is indispensably necessary to
protect sore clear right, which would otherwise be let,
or ireatly enrlani{ore, and which cannot be saved or
protected in any other way. This rule should be equal-
ly applicable to every class of subject matter over
which courts of equity can exercise jurisdiction.
Joint Stock Assoclations:- The rules governing the am
(1) 'ee diseentlng opinion by Mller J. in Earton v
Barbour 14 Otto (U.S. ) 126.
)ee also 21 Am. Law Review, 141.
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polntrment of a receiver In cacoes effecting the aver-
age joint stock arn-ocizition are practically the same
an those In partnership cases; but If the joint -tock
association has been Incorporated, and has assumedt the
powers and liabillties of c, orportlon pr(, rthen,.
the rules of appoInment will conform more nearly to
those existing In the case of a corporation.
In an action foi specific performance:- A receiver
may be appointed in this clasc of actions when it fap-
pears that the purchaser can be compelled to execute
h is contract, and that the circumstances of the case
render such an appointment necesary. (1)
In an action for a divorce:- A receiver may in cer-
tain cases be appointed over the property of the hu8-
band, to enable the court to apply so much of' the prop-
erty as may be necesFary to the suinort of the defen-
dant during, the lltlgcitlon. (2)
In case of executors and administrators:- A receiver
will be appointed in this clt:s. of cases when it can
(1) B~oehia v ,-Tood, 20 \!all. (U.S.) 60.
(2) Kirby v Kirby, 1 Paiqen Ch. 261.
be cleirly ;hovrii that the,-e In eminent dan'ier of their
waoting or mrnapplying the aaoets, or that a portion of
the trust fund will be loot through their misconduct
or n-,lgI.-ence. (1)
In ctu. e of truoteeo:- Under circumitanceo analogous
to those just mentioned In the case of the executors
and admini.3trators, a receiver will be al.pointeri over
the property under the control of a trustee.
In case of infants and lunatlcs :- The court of chan-
cery frequently Interfere by the appointment of a
elver to protect the estate of an infant. (2)
SO also in the cane of a lunatic when proceedings
have been commenced for the appointment of a cornls-
slon. (3)
To secure the rents and profits:- A receiver may be
appointed over real property for Its better protection,
and to secure the rents and mrofits pendente lite.(4)
In the case of joint tenants and tenants in common:-
In rare instances equity will appoint a receiver over
(1) Mlddleton v Dodswell, 13 Voses Ch. 266"
II v'torys Equity Jurisprudence. )ec. 36.
(2) a11atter of Kentoa, 5 Blnn. 61C-.
(c) Z,,tter of Vniorn, 5 Pai,'p Ch. 2zC.
(4) High on Feeivers, Sec. 55G
P'ost v Door, 4 Ed. Ch. 41;.
,1 F
property involved In l t!'' tion grow i, , out of con-
flictlni; claims of joint ten,rits, or tenLnts in corimon.
In. ce cf ven,'or and purcth,.;( r :- The court will vrant
a receiver in this clamn of csecs, only i,,hen It ,r'e:rs
that such sumrary proceedinq;s are absolutely necenc;ry
to irotect the rlihts of both parties in the cause.
In Insolvency proceedings:- Here a receiver may be
a:p)olntvlq almost as a matter of course i-reepective of
the mture of the controveroy, vhenever the court deems
a receiver necsc-3ary to fully protect the rights of
the litigating partles.
Thus I have briefly enumerated the principl
subject muitter over ;ihic, a receiver may be ,I:polnted,
and the general ir~nciplec amrVlicable to the name; but
it must not be understood, that the appointment of a
receiver 1-; confined to these cases L-lone, for the ap-
pointmrtent of a receiier 1 ," a matter restinc" entirely
vlithiln the soud 'tlocrtlion of the court, and will
always be governed by a consirderation of the 'rinciple,.
,16
already mentloner] and the imi tiec hlcb are Involved
in eacP ptirti ciur'1 cta(.
VTno muy be tippointed.
The ,jeneral, cilmost tmiversvl, rule reqnlreu that
a receiver should be a disintere, ted party. To ap-
point, a party who is intererttei in the property, or
subject mutter in litic.atiorn, would ,in most cases tend
to defeat the very objects, for which a receiver shouli
be appointed.
A receiver should be a percon of the highest In-
tegrity, and of peculiar lndependence of character.
He must be able to act vulth entire impartiallity and must
not be suoceptable to any advances towards favortisim.
Further he should be a perfnon of larg,,e and voried
busilnes knovlerlge an.- experience. The amount of
knovwie<v,-(e and ability reQuired varies with the n ,ture
of the subject matter, over x> ic, the receiver i,, to be
appointed; but in all eases it should be sufficient to
1 7
enable hir to transact the buliness incumbeat upon him,
without the intervention of -, third party.
JA party occupying a fiduciary relation, or any
relation incemopatable with the chaiacter of a receiver,
will not be appointed.(1) Thus it io that trustees
and guardlans will not be f-ppointefl over the property
or ftud under their control. An attorney in the
cause hao been held to be absolutely riequalified to
hold hi8 office. (2)
Neither should a party be appolted who hasi any
Interest, which in any way conflicts with the interest
of the esntate or funrl in controversy; or who has at any
time been guilty of fraud, or mslocondurt in connection
with the oame.
It lo generally neceessary that the perron select-
ed shoulJ be a res-ident of the state or jurisdiction
in which the action in pending. This rule,however.
has no applicatlon to a receiver appointed by a feder-
al court. (3)
(1) Sykeo v Hastings, 11 Veses Oh. 363.
(2) Catrland v Garland, 2 "" i" 13,7.
Byckman v Parkine, 5 Palges Ch. 548.
(d) Taylor v Life Assn. of America, 13 Fed. Pep. 4[-%
118
The_,e Erener-i l prnclplo.- may be ciome what mod-
il1iu by the awjrecment of' all the ilartle8 coneerned,
but a clear departure from them 7will rarely be sought
for, and 1e frequently granted.
Time of Appointment.
Under the former practice, both in thlrs country
and In Lfiflunu, the court would not entertain an
plicatlon for the apoIntment of a receiver until the
defendant had appeared and answered. 1But gret Injuo-
tice and hardship often remulted from a otrict adherence
to this arbitrary rule; and court. of equity gradually
relaxed the former practice, and even made departures
from it, in case, of emrer)ency, where delay would re-
cult In irreparable lo8 or great injustice to the
party seeking relief'. (1)
.It ma,' now be re;ardel as the prevailing practice
for courts to appoint a receiver at any stage of the
proceedings after the filing of the bill, upon 8uffic-
(1) Vlost v Swan, ( Ed. Gh. 420.
Clark v lidgley, '[ Md. Ch. 70.
I1 9
lent cause being shoim. A receiver may also be tip-
pointed ut the f'nol hearing or even after, where the
relief sought Is indlspensably neceo..;ucy for the pro-
tection of the partle8 in Interest.(1)
Under the equity pietlce, t court will not be
U'tlefled in appointing a receiver, unless an action
has been commenced, save in the exceptional cases af
infants and lunatics previou8ly mentioned. 'In nome of
the rtutes the time of appointment It regulated by stat-
ute; but little change from the old practice has taken
place.
.Lihnuer of ippointrnenl.
Bv motion for order of appointment:- Such notion
should' be addressed to the court, and should be baced
upon affidavito showing the necessity for the relief
sought, unless the paper on which the moving party
seeks the relief are clreany on file in the casle. (2)
Notice of thl, Totion should be served upon all
(1) Hills v Moore,,15 Deaver 175.
(2) Hungerford v Cuching, 8 Wis. 3f20.
neocefsary and Intee ted partlec, and should c-tate the
object of the tp!plicnti!on, and upon ,h t pleadings andt
pupero, if any, the motion v ill be fot'ided. (1) To
Justify departure from this established rule, requiring
notice of al.plication, the ft- cts and cir(atfrnstce ; ren-
dering such sur'wivry 1)roceedin*s ne es sary, must be
fully set forth. (2) Only In extreme cases , where
the rlelaty whih would follow from H'ing notice would
be likely to result in a loss or diminution of the
property to vxhich the receivership relates or where
Irreparable injury would be sustained, will notice be
dispensed with. Thus where the defendant has ab-
sconded, or is about to remove property from the state,
no notice ic necessary. ("-) So if the defendant has
vol'Lntarily appeared, notice has held to have been
walved. (4)
The affldavlts upon which the pltintiff baw ea
his motion should be clear and vunequivical, and not
mere general alle .ations or expressions of opinion.
(1) Tibbalos v Sargeant, 14 h.J.Eq. 449.
(2) Verplanck v erchntile Ins. Co. 2 Paiges Ch. 43l
(') High on Feceivers, Sec. 117.
(4) GIbson v Martin, 6 Palges Ch. 471
McCarthy v Peake, 9 Abb. Pr. 164.
If fraudI is alleged thct;e speclfIc acts conrtitutln ,
the alle ed fruui must be ,tto te1i-. (1)
The object of notic,,e 1,i to give the (Iefendunt
an opportunity to I)e heard In hl, lefenoe, and he may
appear at the hearing and preoent affidavit. Support-
lng his pooltln, and tending t.. mefe't the pDtintiff's
motion. (2)
At the ti---e appointed, the court hears the affid-
avit,- which have beew presented, and exa.inethe plead-
Ings which are On file In the casqe, If there be any,
und from a conaellratlon of the evidence thus slubmitted
deterilne8the propriety of granting the application.
.If the motion be denied the plaintlff can only obtain
relief from auch decree by presenting new affidavits
which constitute sufficient ground to justlfy the
court In sustalni'ig hi motion.
If the court grants the application for a re-
celver an order for his appointment should be drawn up,
and should contain In g-rleneral outline the prlncllal
(1) Latham v Chafee, ,1 Fed. !Lep. 52g.
(2) Edwards on Recelvers, 6t.
powern and dutles whlleh arc- delegted to him, and a Ouf-
ficierit discrIptlon of' the subject matter of tho receiv-
ership to enable the receiver to readily identify It.(1)
The order may also contain Inotructioas in regard to t'o
managerae lt of' the trust property; but no directlons as
to Its final disposition can properly be made until the
rendition of' the final decree.
The court may draw up this order, or it may allow
one as submitted by the 'laintifft attorney, or one,
the terms of' which have seen agreed upon by the partles
in Interest. (2) The latter practice would sceem to
be the most-equitable one, but under no circumetances,
will the court allow an order wh§ich contains provisions
that are contr,-ry to public policy.
As soon as the order Io secured It should be en-
tered with tie clerk, and a copy of the ,arrie should be
served upon all Interested parties. (k')
The cou- t may ap)oint a suitable peroon to ct
as receiver or it may refer the matter to a master In
------------------------------------------------------
(1) Crow v Vlood, 1- I3eavan 2 21.
(2) WhItney v Belden, 4 Paiges Ch. 139
(3) Edward on Receivers 61.
chancery.
In the former case the court may name the receiv-
er' upon the hearing- and where this 13 done notice
of thie appointment should be served with the order,
and iloo upon the party appointed or Itmay reserve
the appointment pending a settlement of the order by
the agreement of the : artles. (1)
The formier i'ew iork practice, and the prevailing
practice at the present time, in states having a seper-
ate equity system, Is for the court to refer the matter
of appointing a receiver to a master in chancery.
Thie court may empower the master to appoint a receiver
and tatke fror him the necessary security, or Itmay
simply empower him to report to the court the names of
one or more suitable persona to act in that capacity,
ln which case hl,-, selection murst be approved by the
court. (2)
In either case the master should be provided with
a certified copy of the order of reference. Some
(1) VanSant. EQ. Pr. 'ec. 465.
(2) Barb. Ch. Pr. Vol. III, 670.
authoritles hold this to be absolutely necessary. (1)
The master unua-lly proceeds to bring the interest-
ed partles together by means of' the- cumman. Thin Is
simply a paper' in the form of' a notice, entitled In the
cause and nigned by the master, appointing# a time and
place for a hearing preliminary to the selection of a
receiver. (2)
If the personal examination of any party summoned
Is lecurel, the summons should be underwritten by the
muster, oettinKf; forth the object of such attendance. (3)
In case the defendant makes Iefault in appearlng,
a motion for an attachment may be made, and if the de-
feniant does not then appear, the court will allow the
atttachment to issue. (4)
At the hearing, it is cuotomary for the master to
receive written proposals from any interested person,
containing the name of the party whom they wish to act
as receiver. If the defendant does not appear ouch
proposals are usually confined to the moving party.
(1) Quackenbush v Leonard, 10 Paigec Ch. 13.
(2) barb. Ch. Pr. Vol. II, 477.
(4) ,Jil Jil on Jee i ve U" 6 .(4) Edward on Becelver8 - z.
In the :electiori of i receiver the ma oter should
exercise Oound discretion and appoint the person Whom
he considero beat fited to fill the pltice, irrespective
of party recomnmendation or self solicltation. (1)
Frequently more than one receiver ic appointed
over the same oubject matsr , but their Intere.-tsmuet
be such that they will in no way conflict. Thi may
be done v,hen the duties involved in the oerformance of
the trust, would be no grt-at as to render it Impractica-
ble for one person to attempt to perform them; or where
different courts have appointed different receivers over
the same property.
When the master has selected a proper person to
act as receiver, he should fix the amount of his bond,
and see that sufficient and proper surlties are given. ( )
The master should then make a report to the court,
stating the preceedings which have been taken and fhe
result obtained. (4) If the master has only been em-
powered to recommend come proper person to the court to
(1) Lespinaose v Bell, 2 Jac. & X. 436.
(C) Edward on Receivers, -5.
(4) ,1 Barb. Ch. Pr. C-17
act be receiver, hle selection must be approved by the
court, and until such confirmation, the party appointed
cannot lolly enter into the performrnncc of his
duties. (1)
.If either party Is disatisfied with the masters
selection he cannot, except to it; but must make a spec-
ial application to the court, that the master review
his decision. (2) This application rosy be made
either by petition or by motion, if by petition, the
petition should state the grounds of objection. (U)
By an order to show cause:- This is an exparte order
and ic granted upon motion by the plaintiff, and should
be served upon all interested parties. It is in ef-
fect notice to such parties to appear at a certain time
and place, and show cause why receiver should not be
appoin ted.
Upon the appearance of the parties notified, sub -
stantially the same proceedings are taken as upon an
ordinary motion, cave that the burden is upon the defern.
------------------------------------------------------
(1) In the Mratter of the Eagle Iron 'orks, 8 Palge Ch.
385.
(2) Brower v Brower, 2 Ed. Oh. 21.
(83) Tihrape v Thrape, 12 1oesec Oh. ClIVY;
In the Ivatter of the Eagle Iron V/ork:. suu)ra.
tint to ohow why a receiver Fhould not be appointed.
For thli purpose he may offer affidavits, which may be
rebutted by counter affidavite on the part of the
plaintiff. If the defendant ohov,, to the eatle-
faction of the court, that the rights of the partlec
in Interest can be fully protected1 without the appoint-
ment of a receiver; or that the appointment of a re-
ceiver will in no way add to their security, the ap-
plication will be denied, otherviise it will be :rant-
ed, in which case, the manner of hie appointment mill
be the came ac upon an ordinary motion. (1)
The practice under the code.-- rhio io in many respects
similar to that formerly prevallint; under the old chan-
cery practice. (2) Indeed, in come respects, it is
almost ilentical.
01) See upon manner of avijointment generally,
II, Barb. Ch. Pr. 308 - 318;
High on heceivers, 'C;ec. 62 - 118;
Edward on heceivero, ¢4 - 95;
Beech on BeceiverrF, Sec. 71- 73.
(2) v:etter v Chlieper, 5 Abb. Pr. 92;
Robinson v Hadley, 11- Beavan 614;
Ireland v Nichols, 35 How. 222;
In ' eneral a receiver may be appolnt C at any
stage of' the i-roceedlng,,s, but 'Jplication mu:t be made
by motion tit a specitl terra of the court. The court
ry, grant the order and wppoint t receiver tt once, or
it may refer the matter to a referee, who stands in the
came rel tlon to the court as the master formerly did.
The rules g overning the appointment of' recelvers,
e.-cept those which are specially provided for are laid
dovn in the code of civil precedure, (1) and will be
found, upon careful examination, not to vary materially
from the old practice. (2)
Sections 178ti- 1789 provdde for the uppointment
of a receiver in an action to di.;colve a corporation
and are in effect but an extention of the former prac-
tice in such cases.
Under the code a receiver appointed pendente lite
is called a temporary receiver till after judgment Is
rendered; and though exempt from many of the duties
(1) Section 1'13 - 1'16, Code Civil Pro.
(2) For full discussion of this subject and review of
authorities, see note in 19 Abb. N.C. 359;
2,e0 also article in 25 1.lb. Lai- Jour. 326;
, I,, I, viait's Practice, 202 - 272;
1"11 I, Vanmant hq. Pr. 8 Z4 - 409.
and liabillt.i(es of' a permanent receiver, yet he is. held
to a strict ac-outability by the court a!polntlng him,
for any departure from his prescribed powers and duties.
The court, may loo direct a judgment debtor
to convey or deliver to the receiver, any property of
which he may be the owner, In much the same manner as
tunder the old chancery system. (1)
Securi ty.
This has long been considered as one of the es-
senticil prerequisitere, before a receiver can enter upon
the performance of his duties. It .Is usually in the
form of a bond or recogmizance, with sufficient aure-
ties, for the faithful performances of' his duties.
hle amount of this bond valies with the nature and val-
ue of the subject matter of the receivership.
Formerly security must always be given, exeept
in ceses where the parties themselves agreed upon a
receiver, and also agreed to dispense with the usual
(1) Code of Civil Pro. Sec. l
security. (1) lut In Nev, York the obllq~tioci of H
receiver to ixe adequate security for the fuaihful per-
formance of his trust is ref.;arded as being, founded upon
the , enertil practice of the courts of equity; and it
is held to be within the power of the court to dis-
pense with security, where it is plainly unecessary.( 2
Security, iowvever, In seldom dispensed tivth, even in
New Zork, the usual practice being for the court to
require at leqst two sufficient sureties.
Tre sur ties are generally aTAproved by the court,
unless other provisions are made in the order of ap-
pointment, when they may be a pointed by the clerk of
the court out of ivhich the order isued. The bond
upon being properly executed should be filed veith the
clerk, and u til this is done, the receivers title and
authority does not vest.
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(1) Mamners - Fruze, 11 Beaver, 80.
(2) High on Beceivere, Sec. 120.
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Uenertil i,'ature of.
Since a receiver in an officer of the court ap-
polinting him, and a reprenontatlve of all partien, whlo
may eotublinh clairrm In the case, It follown that h I
powers iniependent of the court, are linited in extent,
and conrined lriost exclusively to such an are nece.n-
narily Implied by virtue of hln -,ponitlon, or are con-
fered upon him by the courne and practice of the court.
it
Ac a i:eneral proponition, A may be Ocald, that 3
receiver can act only uider the anthorltY of the court;
but as it would be incorv)atable with the dignity of' the
court, to be obligel to direet the performance of hic
ever:y act, and superintend the execution of the ,ame,
it follows ats aj matter of course, that a recelver in
vente wit- :1 considerable amouit of discretion in the
dlnclharg;e of hin minor dutler;.
In the eXerclne of e,uhc dicretion he shoul'I ,,t
all time' ende,-ivor to :tct In 1oorl falth, and In s ,uch
a marier as not tr prejudice the righte of any inter-
estel partle-.
If Lt any time doubt arlses as to the proper
course to persue, he should apply to the court for the
requi ito Information. (1) If the pov.era relative to
the execution of hil truqt are stated in the order ap-
pointIn- hli, he should be careful not to exceed the
prescribed lImilt. In brief, his authorlty is the
authority of the court appointing hiam, and cannot be
materially rectricted or enlarged, even by the -i(ree-
rent of the partles at whose instance he was appointed.
iithouTt Applicition to the Court.
lig-ht to tAke po;se..ion:- A receiver upon be-
in' appointed my proceel at once to take possession
of the property over which he is) appointed, without
---------------------------- -----------------------
(1) people vLife Insc. Co. 'Y9 Nl.Y. 2b§t.
further order or leave of the coutrt, if n% opposition
ie offered ,y the party in pos:se8sion. (1) In case
the party in possession reftaseo to convey the pro 'erty
to the receiver, the receiver rri' . apply to the court
frr aa order compelling him to 4Io so.
In iew York I t is held that. tthe receiver's title
and right to possession vests back to the date of the
original order for the appointment, .ilthough the Pro-
ceclings may riot be perfected till a later date; and
that the receiver's title and right to possession dur-
ing the interval between su'h ori-inal order and the
time of perfectini K > ap-ointment, are superior to th
those of a judgment creditor wlho levies upon the prop-
erty, under his judg 7ment during3 suc.] interval. " (2)
In no case is the receiver authorized to use
force for any improper meann to obtain possession of
the property. In some states an assIgnment of' the
realt7 must be made to the receiver before his rig ht
of posseosion accrues; (C) but nearly all of the 8tute ,,
(1) Parker v Browning, 8 Pai.eo Ch. 888.
(2) Stute v Stur,.7c;, 5 Abb. Pr. 42 t
illOo v filson, 1 Barb. Oh. 592.;
Btorm v \fall, 2 Sanif. Ohi. "94.
(C) Ohaut, unIua County ,ank v Paqley, 19 .Y. C58.
he would be empowered to possnOs ilrmself of the per-
soMimlty by virtue of' his order of' appointment. (1)
His ponoesslon once obtlaed, becomes the posses -
n, oni of' the court, and will riot be permitted to be dip-
turbed without its consent. (2) %hi8 rule Is thus
stated by Swayne J. : "nor vill the court permit the
ponseosion (f the receiver to be di.turbP ie).7 force,
nor violence to be offered to his, pernon, while in the
d!rcharge of his offilil duties. In Puch c' v:ec the
court will vindicate its authority and if need be pun-
isri the of'fender "by fine, imprisonment or contempt. "(, )
Thin power should be exercised with the utriost
c-aution, and only when the property 8ou!,ht to be taken
-ponnoenuon of , is clearly a part of' the -ubject matter
of the receivership. .If the receiver Is uricertin,
as to the identity of the subject matter, recourse
should be had to the court to determine this question.
Mian8gement of the trust property:- A receiver
likewise has some discretion in re-rd to the manaie-
---- -- -- - -" ---n- -- -'-- - -- -- -) - -- -- -
(1) Luinh v Schenerhorn, 1 Clarkes Ch. .97, and note.
iiloq o . v Allen, 6 Barb. b'2.
(2) hoe v (ibson, z PaI e E, Ch. 13
J3ruce v fL(. & K. l.E.Co. 19 Fed. lheD. 342.
( D) avis v (ray, 16 l . (. . 2 18.
ment of the property entruntel to hin care. This
discretion In, limited almont excluoively to the minor
and le ,inij-or tuit detn,)l-. in the per f'.,rmance of' hin
dutien,; and arlsn either from the nature of the nub-
ject rmtter over whl:ii ho in oppointed, or Is implied
from the instructions of the court.
Tlhough thin d_ax tion in allowed,the receiver
is nevertheless amenable to the court for its proper
exercise; and unleno he employs a reanornable amount of
businenn care and diligence, the court will hold him
responsible for any lo88 of the trunt funds whi<oh may
result.
A receiver may make such repairs of' the property
under his control as are absolutely necensary for it-;
preservation; but the courto !coks with 8usplction up-
on any expendlturen for thin purpose, and if any ques-
tion arineo an to their necenoitY or propriety, the
court may refer the matter to a master for Investi-
ga ti on.
-itx the exceytlons juit noted, a reoeiver hu- lit-
tle conatrol over the tru,- t proerty, , ard whenever
queotlonc arlge whose decilnion would materially effect
the interest of the party, It would be a gro .nc vio-
lation of his trust, for him to act without 1-oplication
to the court.
hploylng help:- A receiver may employ ouch
help as may be necessary to carry out the inotructiono
of' the court. (1) P ut he will not be tllowed any
expenec? whichl he has incurred in employing held to
perform, that whilch he, himself, might have done. (2)
A receiver may employ suitable counsel, when
nececary, but he i prohlbited fron employing the
attorney of either the plaintiff or defendant in the
cane, when he inP acting adversely to any of the partle
in the litigation. (3)
Protecting the trust property:- It Is the duty
of a receiver to take all proper means to protect the
property uinder hiq control, and the court will nustln
any re,.1onaole conduct on the part of the receiver,
(1) Taylor v Sweet, 40 1v1i6-A. 7 36.
(2) Carey v Long, 4C5 Uow. Pr. 504.
(a) Byck v Parkino, 5 Palges Ch. 54k;
Tbhe m-atter of Rob. Ainsley, Receiver 1 Ed. Ch.E76
whicl it deems necessuiry to tccomplih thin end. (1)
ThiAs 1 evpeclally true in cact, where the property
in threatened withn sudden dentruction, or where the
delay incurred b'. auiplication to the court would re-
sult in serious loss or diminution of' the trust estite
As emergencle8 of this kind do not frequently ariee.,
a receiver will seldom be culled upon to act without
express authority from the court.
Under the Direction cf the Court.
1his class embraces thone powers which can only
oe exercised uadler the lrimediate aupervislon and con-
trol of the court. From the nature of a receivers
position and his Intimate relation to the court, it
will be rea dly een , that this claso of Dowers must
be the most extensive and important which he is called
upon to perform.
Continuing business :- In absence of express
instructions from the court, a receiver h-i no author-
(1) Iddings v hruen, 4 Sandf. Ch. 41z.
ity to continue the buslnene of the party or corpor-
ation over whoio Tro!ierty he hun, been NI.T)oint d. The
primary object f'or Wilch a receIver in ,ppoirlted 18
not to embu-irk la bu-inenc et rise; and thin will
only be tllov,ed when it will be ,,ubnervlent to the bet.
beet interests of those beneficially entitled. (1)
Examples of thln) occur most frequentl,,i in the case of
corporations and partner,hip. And a receiver hao been
duly authorized to continue such busineco, a court wi 1
will allow him considerable latitude in the management
of the name. provide,1 no radical dparture from the
customary method of conducting the business is at-
temp ted.
Receivers are often iven the control and man-
uqement of extended lines of railroad; and when thns
-,ppointe- often carry on for a considerable tlme very
extensive business operations, employing) a large num-
ber of pervant.n, and performing for the public greneral-
ly all the functions of' a common carrier. So, in
(1) Jackson v Deforest, 14 How. Pr. F31.
the case of par tnersihius),, when It is deemed e:.:pedient
by the court, thnt te business of the concern be con-
tinued., receivers are often entrusted wit-. its contrel.
Dut In these cases, as in others 6f a similar nature,
the source of their power is the court itself, and
they still remain accountable to it for the faithful
dicharg<e of their dutles.
Making sales:- A receiver has no power to dil-
pose of any portion of the T)ropierty or fund under his
control, without thae consent of the court expressed
or Implied. ,3uchl power is usually conferred upon t1
the receiver by direct order of the court, but it may
ari e by implicatlon ; an vhere J receiver 1 -pPointed
over prCperty of a perishable nature, or where he is
empowered to engt-ge in some business, the successful
prnocutlon of' which, reQuires the purchase and sale
of' conmmodities which form a part of the subject matter
of the recelverhip.
A receiver will ordinarily be illowed to sell
personilty and collect such outstUinding reoot8, nt-i ,re
necesnsry to a final dispoltion of the property, vwitiw-
Out exprens diroectiori of the court. (1) Vihen a
receiver has been authorized to sell re,',lty, he may
give 'i 'eed of the anme, but such der io- not be-
come absolute till ratified by the court. (2)
Frequently the court refaseo to ratify a sale
made by . receiver, when it a)pears tht the co8ider-
--tion r-2celved is gro ssly inadeimqute, or where there
are circumstances ;hic, raiae presumption of fraud
or improper conduct in connection with the n'tle. The
purchaser takes the oroperty subject to this implied
condition; and hence, the power of rescisslon ;hich
may be exorcised by the court cannot be said in any
way to, "impair the obllg ttion of contract. " (3)
1 receiver han no power to purchase ot bin own
sle, In absence of strLtutory provieions,unless stip-
ulations to that effrct are agreed upon by the inter-
ected parties. (41) If the receiver procures the sab
-------------------------- 
-------------------------(1) Rockwell v Merwin, 8 AI b. Pr. (N.S) 380.
(2) Krontz v N\1orthern Dank, 16 vwi. (U.,F. ) 16.
(8) vandervelt v Peceiver Little, 48 JS.J.Eq. 66..
(4) rnderson Y Anderson, 0 fr.Lo. E .
sale by fraud or Impositlon upon the court, an action
would lie to net ncide the sale, even thou;h relief
mi ght be had upon motion before the court appointing
him. ( 1
Paying out money:- The c,,urt is very reluctant
to allow a receiver to expend any of' the funds belon'-
Ing to the trust property, without its consent, (2)
and only in canen of absolute necens-lty, when such ex-
penditures -,re nmall in amount, and are made in rood
faith, and for the benefit of those ultimately entitl-
ed, wfill the court allow the receivear to be reimburs-
ed for Bucl outlays. (3)
ThiR rule has been long recognized and strictly
enforced, and the receiver who Jlnre ar-t It acts at
his peril, and will be liable for any lose whiMh may
tesult, and will be subject to removal at the pleasure
of' the court.
Nothing would be more productive of serious re-
sults, than for the court to allow a receiver free die-
----------------------------------------------------
(1) LHackley v Draper, 60 1K. . 868.
(2) II Story's Eq. Jurleprulence, 66C a.
(a) Condry v l.] .Co. 9C ,U.. CG52.
posltion of the trmnt fuidc. ,
If at any time It becomes necencs'ry to pay out
money to meet legitimate expenses, the receiver should
apply to the court for leave to do oo. (1) Sueh ap-
Dllcatlon should be maide in the form of 'J petition
and nhouli or-lnarilly be in writing, and should con-
tAn a -tatement of the amount to be expended, the.
specific object therefore, and the nae or names of
the partyor partie,; to whom oucUl mone;_ or property io
to be felivered. The court will irant pueh a DetIt-
ion whenever, In the exerclse of Its -liscretion, it
deems such expe-di ture necem-ary and proper.
lrlngin" Ond dei(n¢1irl actlone:- In the i er2foi-
runc( of his varied duties, a recovet is often called
upon to brinc; or Cefend an 8ction In reltntlon to the
subject r-v'tter -un'ler his charg,;e. For tIi D urpose
CA 11eeivcr occupies ci-beitatially the ame to,;]tion
].hI vm oCcupied] by the oriFinal party, avainet whom
or over vvhose estate he vwas appointed. (2)
(1) liooper v Kinston, 24 .Ill. 454.
(2) High on Fee rF, ec. 205.
1iut o1nte, a recclx'(,r Ifs tin offic er of the ,ouLrt
t 1fl) o~ IilnK + JllT), he in t~oweJ1 cccto rltj tute t )roceed -
in n ,el ther n, it lv or in cQul ty, in re-tird to the rub-
n;t,ei of the recoixeCi hip, ,ithou.t eT:rc, uuthoil1,,
from the court. (1) ' ,hon -uch uutitc, rIt;,! hiao been
conferred upon him, he mru,-t et fortt in Tib; tplead-
lIn. and Prove th-,t he u, c duly acppoin ted recci ver,
avi Lcttc', uLnder the direction cf t,e court,. (2)
Ac to whe:hcr a receiver should F;cue in hi-: own
nume, or in the name of the or!Cint-i1 party In whose
favor the action accrued, depend; upon the jurlndic-
tion in which ouch action wuvi brought. In Nlew York,
Loulnidana, Tennoceee, iNewm Jer'ey, CTeorgia and lT "me,
Srecelvr mt,, cue in hic o ir'ri e; but in Penn.qyl-
vanlaj, Indiana, .Ii1nols, ,:i.i, i and Vilencln,
cult must be brought in the rame of the original T'xIty.
(C) In hiew York tnd oome of the other tate this
que,5tion hoc been -ettled by legiclatlon. (4)
Ovin' to t"e positiEon whilch a r(civer ocCupIes,
(1) Storye Eq. Jurldl rurlence, 'ec. 8[, a,
MYerri tt v Lyon, 16 WVend. Z 10.
(2) Daytl: v Connah, 16, LioHo. Pr. ,26.
) iigh on t-eceixers, Sec. 20C - 10, & cases CIted.
(4h Nathan v "-ihitlock, -Pai eo Ch. I52.
it follows theft any defensc TIbleb may be ,ot up by the
or li 1 1m) ty, I equ Ily avn 1llab le, when nu !t If r
brog iht by n recr vyor.
Upon the trial the unun I pract! ce and proc(Aludre
obtiins and no thing further need be F ta ted upon thin
subject in this connection.
Vihen an action is s.ought to be cor.,enced agannst
a receiver, an entirely different question 1i; present-
Cd. As a general rule, a receiver cannet be cued
without t>'e consent of' the court auAolnting him.
TThe courts are unanlmouoly agreed upon thin proposItio-A
in cace of an atterapt made to Interfere -ith the ac-
tual possession of the property, :whlch a receiver
holds ; but ac to vhethei an independent action at lav,,
may be malntaine'i against a receiver, to enforce a
liability vhlch he has Incirred by reason of is, con-
duct, or by virtue of -is relation to the trust prop-
erty, is ( question v,hIch has caused much discusoon,
and upon winjh the courts are not entirely In harmony.
- -----------------------------------------------------
ribe g:;encr:)]ly prevnil1ing opinion, hovever, neems to be,
that the prosecutIn!g" party muta;t f'ir:at obtain the con-
sent of tie court. (1)
S. D. Thompson, edltoei of the Uentrtil 1Iv;
Jomrnal, In comnenting upon an .Iowa cane v-hich had
been declded contrary to this rule, sild:, "'li de-
cl1on ia clearly L!aInt the might of authority.
A receiver hasn been sald to be the arY, of the court
aypointing, him and to admit that such con be sued in
another court, without the consent of hisn ovrn court,
18 virtually to admit that one co-ordinate court can
Sue another; a doctrine absurd as a leide1 proposition
an l mischlevous in ito coneequencer "
( 1)n!el v Smi th, 9 Vesee Ch. D35
Taylor v l@!aldwin, 14 Abb. Pr. 106;
lhobincon v Atlantic U boetern i.Co.66 Pa. St. If;
,ionall v Sampson, 14 How. (U.S.) 65;
-arton v l3arbolur, 104 U.S.
Jonec v 1ro3n, 0 f.L. 8 ;
le1endy v Larbour, -6 Va. 544;
Contra :-
Allen v Central P.R. of 0. 42 Ia. 68;
{inrn%, v Crooker, 18 i. s h;
Apparantly contra :-
tlumenthal v Brainerd, C8 Vt.. 408;
Lyman v F.R.CO. 59 -Vt. 167, (s.c. 10 Ct. &46);
Page v Smi th. 99 1...... o96,
Hill v Parker, il1 mass. 508.
The proper procedure In such canert voulrl seem
to be, for the grievd ptirty to petiti(i the court
for letve to sue te receiver, or to make I motion
for an order of the court grant1ng the rellef ought.
(1) The court is exceedingly adverse to allov; 8n
action to be brought against Its receiver, ar It will
usutally grant the relief' sought by means of an order
vwhenevc;r the sotme results can be. obta ined, and thus
obvitite the necer;sity of' bringing an action.
Extra Territorial Powers.
As a general proposition, the jurisdiction of a
receiver is concurrent w;ith that of the court tcnpolnt-
ing him, but there are some well recogniz :d exceptions
to this genleral rule. For exanple: vvhere a receiver
is aTppointed over a corporation, which has been created
by the combined legislation of several ntates and
v,iiose property extends into different jurisdictions
and connic;ts, as in the caoe of rbilrobds, of one
(1) Rigge hitney, 15 Abb. Pr. 386;
Wlsiwall v Sampson, 14 -How. (U.S.) 65.
indlvi.tilble w.hole, a receivcr tippointed in one jurlo-
diction may exercise control over the entire line. (1)
Put thle doctrine Is repudltited by some of the stttes,
( ) and the contrtiry doctrine has likeulse been laid
doi-in in the federal courts. (') Tlhe only way these
cases can be reconcile(] 1 to hold that In the former
line of cases, the exercise of ouch jurldlotlon wasU
not detrimenttl to the creditors of the judgment
debtor, vihile in the latter line of e,asr-n It was. )
Profeocor Hamllton, after an exaustive discussion of
this question embodying a careful review of' the auth-
oritles, concluded that the followving proposltlons
were sustained by the weight of authority:
1. , 11 y court may appoint a receiver, over property
withcuLt its jurisdictlon as well as within.
2., "Property within the jurisdiction passes to a re-
ceiver per se and the receiver may ass:ert his
-----------------------------------------------------
(1) F-nk v St John, 29 Earb. 585;
Lllei v B.& C.P.F.Co. 107 Mass. 1;
.AlrT eT V Atlantic, & Ral. Co. 2 1oods 416.
(2) aunt v Colvumbian,.Ins. Co. 5 e. 290.
(Ci) Both v Clark, 1Y How. (U.S.) 272.
(4) Hurd v City of Elizabeth, 41 %,.J.L. 1.
right against any court.
S.,"Property out(:Ide of the jurisdiction pastles by the
appointment per 0o as afainot the debtor- and hip
privles, but not a, ,illnt creditors of the debtor,
residing in the foreign jurisdiction, where the
property Is situated, and the courts of such for-
elm juriEdlctlon lll protect the rfights of their
own creditors to the property of' the debtor, theft
is within this jurisdiction, ac against a receiver
appointed by another court.
4.,:'here the receiver has once obtuined rightful pos-
session of the property, he was appointed to take
charge of, he will not be deprived of its posseo-
sion, even thoueh he remove with it to a forelgn
jurisdiction, " (1)
The doctrine just enunciated rests solely upon
the comity of the courts, and subject to the modifi-
cations previously mentioned, receivers are usually
allowed, throubgh courtesy to exercise the ca-me poviere
-------------------------------------------------
(1) Akrticle in 2 2 iwI. Law hog. (E.S. ) 289.
in a foreign jurio;dictlon q; in their ovm.
Stuitutory Poverc).
The law of receivers han undor gone a romarkable
developement during the list two or three decades.
In many of the states statute, have been enacteri, who
objects have been to more accurately determine and fix:
the varledpovero and llabilitles of a receiver. -As a
result of this le!ilation the powere of receivers
have in many cases been gretitly enlarged and extended.
Nothing has contributed more to produce thin result,
than the rapid growth of mCdern corooraite entervrlne,
and the attempt of legislators to meet such growth by
appropriate lei8lation, adapted to new exegencies
which have constantly arises in this branc-. of the law.
It is9 not, however, a part of my theme to dle-
cuss the ltiv arplicable to statutory receiv.ers, and
11 -vlll simply refer the student who Is interested in
this csubject, to time sta.tute of' hi( own state.
C H , P T i_ I I/.
L I A I I L I TI ; 0 F 1- E C E I V L I.
To the Court.
1Y virtue of the relation which a receiver oc-
cuplesit follows logically, that he is at all times
am(- rmble to the court which hap appointed him, for
the faithful performance of the duties which he aoum-
ee. To hold otherwisc ould be to reflect upon the
court its elf; for that court vho does not impos e upon
its ovm officers the same liabilitieo, which others
under like circ-vLstances are made to bear would indeed
be recreant in the discharge of its duty.
Aucordlngly. we find that tA receiver is protecte4
by t1he court, only so far as is neceocgry to subserve
the puryooe for which he wat appointed, and only when
he is engaged in the lawful performance of his dutic
Under these circiunstances, if' loss occurs without any
faulit on the Part of the recelver, the court will not
requlre him to make ruch loo irood. (1)
But if the receiver II tctln,, beyond the ncope
of hic Implle,1 auithority, or derrogation of come ex-
prero Intruction of the court, he will be held lia-
ble for any los or depreelation of the fluid entrustel
to hi- care, though ouch 10cr war vholly unexpected
and not likely to have haimpened from the'course pUr-
cued, and although the conduct of the receiver, war en-
tirely free from Improper motivec. (2)
hecelvers are to a certain extent goveri-ed by
the camrne ruler of conduct and subject to the ,-rtie lla-
bilities as trusteec and others In 'a fiduclary re-
lation. (C) They should never mingle the trust funds
vwith dieIr omin, nor use or Invest them for their own
benefit. (4) If they do, they become liable for any
profito which may accrue from the rome, and in cane
they suffer the truut funds to be mingled with their
own, the burden is upon them to show what part of the
----------------------------------------------------
(1) Union Lank Care, 32 N.J.hQ. 4C.
N) M atter of Staford, 11 Barb. ? , .
(c) Pomeroys Eq. Jurisprulence. Vol. .11j, 13-6.
(Z-) ,:f the (fuardien Saving Institution
78 N.Y. 408.
fundo thus blended belongs8 to thern, and the remainder
will be rem rled cln belonging to the enstate. (1)
J,. Receive- must t-,t certain Bttited or re.7uliir
periods, and whenever c.lled upon by the court, ren-
der a full and satisfactory statement of hie various
receipts and expenditures, in connection ;Ith the prop-
erty under his control. (2.) The court will never al-
low this; report which is technically called an account-
Ing) to be divpensed with. And in nearly every case
of thin kind, where a receiver unreisoably delays to
submit his report, the court matC, in the exercise of'
Its discretion, require him to pay interest upon any
balance, which remains in his hands, from the time
when such reoueot was made until hie accou nting 1s
finally rendered.
It is, customary for the court to examine and
pas upon the various items contained In a receivere
report; and until finally ap!.roved by the court, a
receiver i personally liable for any unauthorized ex-
----------------------------------------------------
(I) Utica Ins. Co. v Lynch, 1. Paigles Ch. 520.
(2) Kerr on heceivern, 238.
pendilture which he has made. Further specific
cau:ew in which 8 receiver Will become personally lia-
ble to the court appolntlng him, need not be g~ven,
since In moot cti'-em this can be determined by an ap-
plication of' the teneral Iirno1pl-e already staited.
-io third Parties.
In genernl:- A receiver if not only respon-
sible to the court appointing hir', but lie In also
responsible to third parties whom his conduct effects,
for the proper discharge of his duties. Indeed, the
primary object which impels the court to no readily
take coqnizance of ever act of misconduct on the part
of a receiver, is to ,-rotect the rights and interests
of the parties whom he ie appointed to represent.
Though this liability tc third parties accrues
upon every breac, of trust effectln ; their rlg*hts, the
conOent of the court must ordinarily be obtained be-
fore it can be enforced. The court Itself may take
cognizane o1 the renreiver, linbl 11 ty and r-c;I ermine
it, or perkit the Lgvrei Yd party to sue at law. 01)
'Whaen the relief eought If; clearly wilthlu the jurisdlc-
tion of'. the court of equity to grant, the better pr .r.-
tice is to see]k the ali of t-e court by petition. ahic
method is muc,-! more e'onomical and equally expeditious.
A receiver v ill not, howoevr, be held per;onally
liable for acts performed! in his official capacity,
but !--e .ill not be allowed to shield himself' behind
this screen, when acting beyond the scope of hiq auth-
ori ty, or in viclation of his trust.
Contracts:- A contract entered into by a receiv-
er without the consentof the court, exvreoed or imu-
plied, does not bind the estate, and the receiver be-
comes individually liable to the perfoanmce of the F,
same. 02) Biut if the contract shoul( be manifest-
ly beneficial to the lnt,:rested parties, the court will
in moot cases ratify it, and thus releive tie receiver
from personal liability. (3)
(1) Klien v Jewett, 26 N.J.]Eq. 476;
See canes cited, supra, page 45 & 46.
(2) 2Ryan v Pand, 20 Abb. N.C. 31.
(3) Krontz v Northern Bank, 16 -Iall. 16.
In b-ome of' the tbtes it has been heir that a
receiver will no,*, 'e T)ound by the contriecs of hie prr4-
ecessor; (1) but in ro t attr this ques ton Ir ,et-
tle'i by the court, by incorporttlng Into the a rrjer ap-
pointing a nei,, iecelver,thc. tcrrms uon Mwhici he Is to
as;ur:,e control of the buires.
receiver cannot. contract so ur to bind the
party or corrioration, over v.-ose prouerty he vas au-
poInted. It usually hapens, however, tlhtat upn the
dlschar! e of the receiver, and the restoration to the
part. 0- corporatic'n of' their property, tat " the
court prescrIbe8 conditions upon vnhich the proPerty
may be taken back; and usually the part', or .Cporatim.
is required to aosmne and carry out ouch contracts in
relation to the pToperty as the receiver boe. by order
of the court entered into," (2)
If a imrty ii induced to enter into a contract,
relYIng upon the perr.n ,l liability of the receiver,
the recelver v ill not there &fter be all med to show
---------- ------- -- ---- ---------- -------------------
(1) Lehigh Coal & Na'. Co.v (en. R.R.Co. of .J.
41 L~J. ti2.j iSV; 
.6odifiee in Vanderbel; v Little, 10 Cent. >ep.
(2) Chas. Flske Bea'h Jr. in letter to writter.
thn t he was contraCtlUK in is official capacity, but
will be responslble for th performance of the con-
tract, aince it wal his duty to .ntate In what capacity
he contracted, at the time the contrant was made.
Torts:- Where the conduct of' a receiver has be
be n such ao to make him liable to an action In tort,
courtos of equity All rarely take cognizanee of the
cane, but will allow the Injured party to report at
once to his rtnmedy at law, It is somewft' t question-
able, whetier equity would have jurlollctlon In this
ci-c of cases, and the weight of autihority seems to
be that it would not. (1) Certainly if' this jurlo-
dictil, doeO exist, it has seldom, if ever, been ex-
ercined.
From ti-e moment of his .- rointment, a receiver
Is subject to peculiar liabilities. The Felerl
courts have even gone so far as to hold that a re-
ceiver who takes peeeesson of T)roperty WIhlic is not in-
cluded within1 hIS truet will be liable to an action
-----------------------------------------------------
(1) Wabac> FiR..o. v 1 .rown, 5 Brad. (Ill. App. ) 590;
PlayS v Jewett, 19 _m. Law heg. & note.
of, trenpasno-, though actIri in perfect good faylt- and
with te lnt entloni of carryini-, out the Intructlon8
of the court. (1) A receivei will be liable for any
neiligence on hin part, whiJc i. caunen ar. loon or dinin-
ution of' the trunt propeity, or reult8 in pernonal in-
jury. (2)
fhether a receiver in offlnially liable for the
negli.geLce of' Mln employees, In a riuer-tiori of great
importance. Thi- question has been decided in the
affirmative a; a very largc majority of the courts of
this couiitry. In Ohio, ]Ne-vv Hampshire, Vermont, New
Jer!-ey, Iowa, and aesachueetto,and Indeed in nearly
every state where tle queotloti han arinen it h'. been
held that a receiver occupiea the same position which
the party or corporation v;hose property has been cofi-
flocated formerly did, and tis ieint,- the case, they
are riot entitled to tny immunitieo from the ordinary
liabilities of' persons conducting such business, and
are conoequently liible to the same extent that te
----------------------------------------------------
(1) Gurran v Craig, 22 Fed. Rep. 17).
(2) Kaiser v K'eller, 21 Ia. .5.
orlI7inl party or corporntor would have been. (1)
Though this li1,e of' reanoning Is ;,ound in principle,
and In clearly sustained by weight of authority, the
courts of New York have allowed theinelves to be un-
wittinrly led into an :~pp arently contrary Jcctrine.
In Cardot v Barney, (2) acase which has caune] the
profession no little amount of trouble, the court
say:, "A receiver who Ltcts in no other capacity than
ao an officer of the court is not liable for an action
of negligence causing the driath of a passeng er, where
no personal neglect is imputed to him, either in the
oelectIon of agents, or in the performance of any duty
Tha't the court, in ,deciding this case, intended to
hold that the trust funds or corporate property could
not be re.-nched through the -.,edlum of a receiver, and
applied to the liquidation of just claims growing out
of the ne.gligence of' a receiver's employeea is not so
evident; but this seems to be the conclusion of' courts
(1) Mer d odminlntratoro v Holbrook, 20 O.St. 187;
XlIen V Jewett, 26 -N.J.Eq. 474;
R.R.Co. v Davis, 25 Ind. 53;
mr entha] v Brainerd, 9,3 Vt. 402;
Pag1e Smith, 99 Mass. 395;
Purs v 1.T. Co. , 34 Fed. Rep. 24-.
(2) 63 iN.Y. 281.
and text book writter igenerally. Hl,,r Ii in his
standard work on receiverc, (1) in commenting upoa
Cardot v barney,and an earlier New York case, (2)
makes the entirely too broad, and come xThat mlslead-
in.,g statement, that 'In view of' these decislono, there
would oseem to be absolutely no remedy in New fork to
one 8ustainlng loss or damage through the operation of
a railroad by a receiver," Iater he refers to Smith
v Kain, (3) and an other more recent case, (4) which
lhe regards as modifing but not materially changing the
doctrine promulgated in Cardot v Barney.
Mr beach, on the contrary, regards Smith v Kain
as sractlcally overruling Cardot v barney. For
myself, I must confess that I do not ceo that Smith
v Kaln dirq!1-,yl overrules Cardot v Barney. The
real point decided in Smith v Kain would seem to be:
\"that if a receiver leases and operates a road over
which he hao not been ap!ointed he becomes liable
even though the court consent to ils so doing.
----- --------------------------------------------
(1) HIlgh on heceivero, Sec. 095, o.
(2 ) Dentz v R.TR.CO. 58 N.f. 61.
( B3) 80 N.Y. 456.
(4) Woodruf'f v Erie R.R.Oo. ( NJ .Y. 60U.
True there is any amotunt of dicta In thic case, clear-
ly showing the disapprovl of the court to the ruling
in Cardot v Barney, ani a tendency of the court to
break awuy from their former position; and there can
be but little doubt thmt if this questlon ca-me
fairly before the courts of this state,,"Nevi York
would be in line with other cIvilized coymunities
upon this quention: " (1)
The liability of a receiver does not cease wtla
the termination of the suit, pending which he was ap-
pointed, but coritinuee tilhli final discharge bj the
court. After his discharge a receiver cannot be made
personally liable for any acts done in his official
capacity or otherwiseif they have been ratifled by
the court.
Peither will the party or corporation over whone
property a re,:eiver was appointed be subject to the
liabilities which he has incurred during his office,
unleos they expressly agree to assume them. (2)
[1) £mt ee tenderson v ',alker, 55 eo. 481.
(2) Davis v Duncan, 19 Fed. rep. 47;
mentz v Buffalo .Y-.Co., 58 N.Y. 61;
tR. -. Co. v Stringfellow, 44 Ark. 5022;
Bell v Indianapolis R..Co., 53 Ind. 57;
Contra:
Sandford v People, 15 Ill. 558.
The rule upon thie once sorne w-h t doubtfual proposltion
is thus stated by ,r. 13ePch:. "It was formerly the
rule In Jdlfchar!,Ing the receiver of, a railway, to im-
pose upon the corporation, liability for the torts
of the reoelver and his employees, but, cmrnmenclnF,
with the Vlabash case, a different rule hao obtained,
and now no intelligent counoel would all,:vT an order
to be enterei impoolnip that liability upon the cornpany
The theory upon ,hinh the more m: odern doct-l!ne rest
Is thie: there is no privity whatever between the per-
son injured by the receiver's tort and the corporation,
and there Is therefore, no rea:.;on why the corporation
should be made liable,"
If a receiver lncurs personal liabilities whic-_
he is unable to meet, the Injured party may proceed
a-iinnt his ,uroties wio are liable for his leftiult to
an amount eual to that speclfled In the receivern
bond. In thls event the nurety is entitled to be
reerabursed as far as may be out of any balance due the
receiver from the em-ntate, ac determined by the receiv-
or's accounting.
hus we ' ee that, Ta recejver's position does not
awval him as a defenrse, when he has been ,uitty of any
act whici would ordinarily make him amenable to the
injured party were he acting;- Inlependently of' the cou-t,
Even this brief .3tudy of' the law of receivers
is sufficient to impress the careful otudent with the
fact that the positlo of a receiver is one fraught
with ;reat responsibility, and calls for the exercise
of the greu test amount of business skill and fidelit-y.
In the dischare of his dutlep, a receiver will often
encounter many obstacles and be subject to rany and
peculiar temp ta tions whi c:, will require the hli hest
Integrity and independeiice of character to overcome.
Tihe interests whlch he is appointed to repre.',ent are
various and conflicting, and often involved In doubt;
yet he should under all circumstances be the equal
repres entatlve of all interested partles: through all
the conflict and f;trife of lltlitlon, he should re-
main Impartial and mreffected b , the advance of rival
clamantB, worklng with one great object in viewA and
that to prove hlmeelf worthy of hi. trulnt.
finl

